The European Union still cannot rely on its own projects alone to secure supplies of critical raw materials, according to a Bruegel policy brief published on 9 July 2026. The paper, written by Madalena Barata da Rocha and Camille Reverdy, argues that the bloc is unlikely to meet its 2030 self-sufficiency ambitions unless it combines investment, binding trade rules and longer-term contracts with supplier countries.
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nes, solar panels, semiconductors and wider digital infrastructure. Bruegel says demand for minerals such as lithium, cobalt, graphite, nickel, copper and rare earths is set to rise sharply over coming decades, while supply remains heavily concentrated in a small number of countries. China dominates large parts of processing and refining, the Democratic Republic of Congo supplies most extracted cobalt, and Australia, Chile and China together account for the bulk of lithium extraction.
That concentration has already given Beijing leverage. The policy brief points to earlier export restrictions on rare earths and to more recent controls on critical minerals and related products, warning that Europe’s vulnerability extends beyond mining itself to processing, magnets and other intermediate stages needed for clean technology and electronics.
The EU’s response has been the Critical Raw Materials Act, which came into force in 2024 and set benchmarks for 2030: at least 10% of annual consumption should come from domestic extraction, 40% from processing inside the bloc, 25% from recycling and no more than 65% of any strategic raw material should come from a single third country at one processing stage. But Bruegel says the current policy mix is not yet strong enough to deliver those goals.
The first round of 60 strategic projects, 47 of them inside the EU, is designed to speed up permitting, offer administrative support and improve access to finance. Yet the authors say the practical advantage of the label is limited, particularly for projects outside the bloc, where it brings prestige more than money. They also argue that estimates of future output are shaky because they rely largely on figures supplied by project promoters rather than independently verified data.
Funding remains another weak point. Bruegel identified at least 21 strategic projects that have received public backing worth about €1.26 billion, including EU money, state aid and support from international financial institutions. The authors say that is nowhere near enough for the scale of the challenge, especially compared with the levels of backing mobilised by the United States and Japan.
By contrast, the report says trade agreements with specific critical raw materials provisions have so far been the EU’s most effective external tool. Such clauses, which can limit export restrictions, cap export taxes, improve transparency and support sustainable mining, are associated with markedly higher exports of critical raw materials to the EU after the agreement takes effect. Bruegel says the evidence is stronger than for broader strategic partnerships, many of which read more like political declarations than binding commitments.
That matters because the EU has signed 15 strategic partnerships with third countries, including Canada, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Namibia, Argentina, Chile, Zambia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Greenland, Rwanda, Norway, Uzbekistan, Australia, Serbia and South Africa. According to Bruegel, however, these partnerships have not yet produced measurable commercial gains.
The report also points to the EU’s own trade policy as a more promising route. In July 2023, the Council authorised negotiations with the United States on a Critical Minerals Agreement, intended to strengthen supply chains and reduce the impact of Washington’s Inflation Reduction Act on European industry. The Commission has also pushed a modernised agreement with Mexico, whose mineral endowment makes it a useful source for EU supply diversification.
Bruegel argues that the Union should go further and create a dedicated investment facility for critical raw materials, rather than relying on a patchwork of existing instruments. It also recommends more public equity participation and state guarantees for high-risk mining and processing projects, tighter verification of promised volumes and deadlines, and greater use of long-term off-take contracts with suppliers.
Recycling, the brief says, will be important but cannot substitute for primary production and imports. The authors call for more ambitious recycling targets and product designs that make recovery easier, particularly as the EU prepares broader circular economy reforms and implements its battery rules.
The paper also warns that member states are often acting in ways that weaken the bloc’s collective position, competing for the same projects and resources rather than coordinating their efforts. In Bruegel’s view, the EU already has the tools; what it lacks is a more disciplined strategy focused on the most serious supply risks.
Source: Noah Wire Services
