Russia’s extensive overhaul of its internet infrastructure aims to create a tightly controlled digital environment, limiting access to global services and promoting domestic platforms amidst increasing censorship and isolation measures.
In recent years, Russia has embarked on an unprecedented project aimed at thoroughly restructuring the architecture of its national internet, known as the “Runet.” According to Elchin Alyoglu, director of Baku Network, this policy of creating a “sovereign Runet” is more than a reaction to cyber threats or an attempt to control information flows—it represents a strategic effort to transform the internet from a global infrastructure into a tool for internal control and governance. This transformation is fostering a distinct digital ecosystem, separated from the global internet and oriented towards autonomous existence.
Data from international analytical bodies like the ShadowServer Foundation reveal a dramatic decline in Russia’s open internet resources, with publicly accessible servers and devices plummeting from approximately 920,000 in October 2024 to just 270,000 by mid-2025. By comparison, countries such as the United States maintain nearly 7 million open servers, Germany 1.8 million, and China 1.2 million. By these metrics, Russia’s digital openness resembles that of smaller European nations like Sweden or Romania. This is not a natural decline or mere infrastructure ageing, but a deliberate dismantling of the open digital environment, affecting mail servers, VPN gateways, routers, video surveillance systems, and other network devices, and steering the digital ecosystem towards a closed, tightly controlled system.
This shift aligns with the Kremlin’s goal of creating a “digital iron curtain” akin to the Cold War’s physical barriers but enacted in cyberspace. National network segments are increasingly isolated, with resources redirected to internal domains and international communication channels tightly regulated. The “intranet model” that Russia is building allows formal connection to the global internet, but filters and limits access to external sources while maintaining internal infrastructure in a quasi-autonomous mode. Though officially framed as a safeguard against external threats and a defender of digital sovereignty, the policy enforces stringent censorship, restricts freedom of information exchange, and imposes technological isolation that adversely impacts business, science, and society in general.
The economic consequences are tangible; the reduction of publicly accessible resources hinders integration into the global technology landscape. It complicates international research collaborations, delays innovation, and effectively severs the technological lifelines vital for economic development. Socially, the shrinking digital space shapes what Alyoglu terms a “digital ghetto,” where citizens rely almost exclusively on government-approved sources and localised services, thereby easing control over public consciousness.
A striking example of this systemic control is Russia’s enforcement of mandatory pre-installed applications on all gadgets sold within the country. As of September 2025, the Russian app store RuStore became pre-installed not only on Android devices but also on iPhones, iPads, and devices running HyperOS. This initiative aims to erode the dominance of global app markets like Google Play and Apple’s App Store, embedding state-approved digital ecosystems at the user interface level. Additionally, the government is replacing VK Messenger with Max, a new communications platform designed to serve as the central hub for digital interaction. The rollout plan includes a January 2026 phase where RuTube is superseded by the “Unified Video” platform, consolidating multiple video services under state oversight. Devices running Huawei’s HarmonyOS come with an even broader suite of pre-installed national apps, essentially turning the gadget into a closed digital ecosystem controlled from Moscow.
This package of pre-installed apps, including social networks, payment systems like Mir Pay, maps, communications, and entertainment, generates a near-monopoly of domestic software controlled or sanctioned by the state. The policy notably curtails alternative choices, likely diminishing users’ attempts to seek foreign services.
Simultaneously, the Russian government has severely curtailed the functioning of global messaging platforms. Since August 2025, millions of users experienced disruptions in voice and video calling functions in Telegram and WhatsApp. The domestic communications regulator Roskomnadzor justified these restrictions by citing efforts to combat phone fraud, but experts argue this explanation masks a broader strategy: to expel foreign platforms from communication channels and compel citizens to migrate to domestically controlled services like Max. Voice calls, which are end-to-end encrypted and challenging to monitor, create “blind spots” for security services, motivating targeted restrictions on these features.
Technologically, these measures are implemented using Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) systems integrated into telecom infrastructure. DPI technology identifies voice traffic signatures and can selectively degrade or block connection quality, forcing calls to drop or become unintelligible. This granular control allows the state to phase in restrictions without provoking widespread panic, nudging users towards government-sanctioned alternatives.
Officially, Russian authorities claim multiple motives for these policies. One hypothesis is to protect mobile operators from revenue loss caused by voice-over-IP calls via messaging apps, which bypass traditional telephony charges. However, telecom industry data suggest that internet traffic growth offsets these losses, rendering this explanation insufficient. Minister of Digital Development Maksut Shadaev argued that the majority of fraudulent calls utilize WhatsApp, justifying restrictive measures, though stated government statistics show a notable decline in such scams. Critics view these safety claims as a propaganda front, obscuring broader political and social control objectives.
The most plausible interpretation is that these partial network blockades serve as tests in preparation for potential future large-scale communication shutdowns, or “white-listing” of internet resources. This view gains weight amid ongoing speculation about internet restrictions coinciding with political or social events.
Despite these strict controls, there has been some public dissent, including voices within government circles and the pro-Kremlin digital “Z-blogosphere.” Some deputies have warned that restrictions will boost VPN usage, which already undermines censorship efforts. However, criticism has been quickly muted, with the official stance remaining firm.
Beyond direct censorship and blocking, the Russian government has expanded its legal arsenal. Recent legislation penalizes online searches for materials deemed “extremist,” with vaguely defined terms encompassing opposition groups and LGBTQ+ communities. This adds another layer of restriction over digital freedoms.
Human Rights Watch and other organisations report widespread blocking of independent media sites, human rights platforms, and opposition figures, alongside efforts to disable VPN services, which further isolate the Russian internet user base. Moreover, extensive “resilience drills” conducted by authorities to test the network’s isolation mechanisms have caused significant disruptions in services such as online banking, state portals, and transportation apps, challenging government claims that ordinary users remain unaffected.
Balancing the official rationale of cybersecurity and sovereignty against these tightening controls reveals profound trade-offs. While Russia endeavors to shield critical infrastructure from external threats—a particularly pressing concern amid sanctions and ageing hardware—it simultaneously endorses severe restrictions on information freedom and economic connectivity. Cyberattacks on major state entities, including a notable July 2025 assault on Aeroflot, have demonstrated the limits of isolationist security measures.
These changes mark a philosophical shift from the internet as an open, decentralised system fostering free information exchange towards a vertical, state-controlled digital environment. The Kremlin’s push for domestic technology development, from social networks to payment systems, is accompanied by challenges—national platforms often lack functionality and user experience compared to global counterparts, breeding frustration among users.
This complex transformation carries significant consequences: while enhancing state control and risk mitigation, it damages Russia’s integration into the global digital economy and degrades the quality of life for millions of internet users. The internet, once a window to the world, is becoming a curated showcase of pre-approved content.
Analysts compare Russia’s digital policies with China’s longstanding “Great Firewall,” noting that Russia’s pursuit of digital autonomy has accelerated dramatically since the geopolitical turbulences post-2014 and following the 2022 Ukraine conflict. Massive financial investments underpin this transition, but Russia faces a strategic dilemma—whether it can sustain a closed but functional digital system or will suffer technological stagnation and global marginalisation.
In summary, Russia’s “sovereign internet” project is a vast social and technological experiment, reshaping the digital landscape of a country with nearly 100 million internet users. The choices made now will likely define the future relationship between the state, society, and technology in Russia.
Recent reports illustrate the increasing censorship and isolation accompanying these changes. In 2024, Russia blocked a record number of over 417,000 websites, predominantly targeting content related to gambling, piracy, and other prohibited materials. Official agencies, notably the Federal Tax Service and Roskomnadzor, led the blocking efforts, with a significant portion executed extrajudicially. Human Rights Watch has highlighted that many blocked sites belong to independent media, human rights groups, and political opposition, many designated as “extremist” under broad national laws. Additionally, VPN services are under attack, further restricting online freedom and deepening isolation.
These measures coincide with increased legal repression. For instance, the July 2025 law penalising online searches for “extremist” materials imposes fines to discourage access to dissenting information. This reflects a broader clampdown on dissent that has intensified since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.
Internet “resilience drills” by the government have also caused service disruptions for ordinary users, including issues with banking and transport apps, contradicting official assurances. These interruptions underscore the increasing control and isolation of the RuNet, aligned with the sovereign internet agenda.
Globally, Russia’s trajectory contrasts with approaches in countries like the US and Canada, which employ sophisticated behavioural analysis and AI anti-fraud protocols to combat telecom scams without resorting to broad VoIP bans. Messaging platforms like Telegram and WhatsApp implement machine learning and spam-blocking tools to tackle scams precisely while preserving communication freedoms.
Russia’s reliance on blunt, coercive measures such as DPI-enabled blocking impacts millions and reflects a prioritisation of state control over individual rights and technological innovation. The “digital iron curtain” is now a reality and stands to reshape the country’s digital future dramatically, with significant implications for society, economy, and governance.
Source: Noah Wire Services
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